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Abstract: ‘Well-being’ is currently in vogue in policy-making circles in the 
Global North as a way of reconceptualising ‘development’. This paper argues 
that its appearances are misleading. While the normative force of ‘well-being’ 
is accepted, what is being offered is a technocratic and reductionist programme 
which collapses ‘well-being’ into the statistical relation of a closed set of 
metrics. It is argued that ‘well-being’ as defined is a chaotic conception; not a 
concrete object but an evaluative state, and so such programmes necessarily fail 
to measure it. Further, it is argued that ‘well-being’ is already considered within 
economic development policy and that previous development initiatives would 
not have changed had well-being frameworks existed alongside them. It is 
suggested from this that ‘well-being’ merely provides a new way of describing 
economic development policy, without altering its fundamental logic or its 
inherent power relations. 
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1 Introduction: ‘Well-being’ is a potential basis for development(s) 
“Understanding and improving well-being requires a sound evidence base that 
can inform policy-makers and citizens alike where, when, and for whom life is 
getting better.” [Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 
(2013a), p.3] 
“The challenge is to ‘universalise’ the framework for understanding well-being 
so that it is relevant for people in countries at all points on the development 
continuum, and then to define appropriate indicators that can capture and 
measure the multi-dimensional aspects of well-being in specific economic, 
cultural and social contexts.” [Boarini et al., (2014), p.10] 
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The concept of ‘well-being’, and the supportive use of programmes to measure it, is 
currently in vogue in the Global North. The policy discourses surrounding it have a 
strong emphasis on the limitations of GDP and the potential for alternatives to ‘growth’ 
as a measure of societal progress. In this it shares much in common with critiques of 
economic development which suggest that the focus on the Northern ideal of expanding 
market-based activities has negatively impacted on social conditions in the Global South. 
Promoters of the concept, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, are increasingly suggesting ‘well-being’ and its measurement as a means 
to achieving economic development (Boarini et al., 2014). 
This paper argues that such a move is mistaken, and that the well-being movement 
shares more in common with existing approaches to economic development (and 
development more generally) than it does with their critique. The hope held out by the 
well-being movement is that merely by swapping one technocratic and reductionist 
measurement programme for another, differently reductionist, one, new ways of acting 
will become possible. This hope, if correctly characterised, rests on two implicit claims: 
that it is possible for a measurement programme to meaningfully encapsulate the concept 
of ‘well-being’, and that ‘well-being’ is not something which can be pursued (or, at least, 
is much less well pursued) in the absence of a measurement framework. It will be 
suggested that both these claims are mistaken. Rather, ‘well-being’ is a chaotic 
conception which cannot be meaningfully reduced to a closed set of indicators; and it is 
an aim which has historically underpinned interventions or justifications for interventions 
in both domestic and international economic development policy. As such, ‘well-being’ 
frameworks only offer a new language in which to talk about policy. This language is 
dangerous, masking the inequalities of power between the author of the framework and 
its subject. Rather than offering new ways for the Global South to articulate its ambitions, 
models of well-being risk being merely new technocratic ways to justify pre-existing 
rationales of intervention. 
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section will briefly outline the features of 
well-being measurement frameworks as they currently exist in the Global North, 
observing that such frameworks necessarily reduce the question of ‘well-being’ to one of 
mechanical numerical movements and so are structurally identical to existing metrics. 
Section 3 will explore the nature of the concept of ‘well-being’, arguing that it is a 
‘chaotic conception’ in Sayer’s sense and thus one which precludes meaningful 
measurement (Sayer, 1981, 1982, 2000). Section 4 will then examine historic approaches 
to economic development, showing both that they already considered ‘well-being’ and 
that they could equally easily be justified using the contemporary rhetoric of well-being. 
In its concluding sections, the paper will suggest that reconceptualisation of ‘well-being’ 
as a technocratic tool merely recasts existing logics of economic development in a new 
language and that to take the concept of ‘well-being’ seriously it is necessary to go 
beyond measurement and towards dialogue with those whose ‘well-being’ is at issue. 
2 The technocratic nature of existing well-being frameworks 
‘Well-being’ is currently fashionable in policy circles in the Global North, giving rise to 
several major measurement programmes. Possibly most advanced is the UK’s Measuring 
National Wellbeing Programme (currently with three years of published data; Office for 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   110 M. Jenkins    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
National Statistics, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2015), and similar programmes or guidelines for 
programmes have been launched by Eurostat and the OECD (European Statistical System 
Committee, 2011; Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2013a). 
Politically, the concept is well-supported, with the UK programme launched by the Prime 
Minister (Cameron, 2010) with cross-party support (New Economics Foundation, 2011), 
the European programme mandated by the Parliament, Commission and Economic and 
Social Committee (Commission of the European Communities, 2009; European 
Economic and Social Committee, 2012; European Parliament, 2011) and both the United 
Nations General Assembly (United Nations General Assembly, 2012) and G20 leaders 
(G20, 2009) issuing statements of support for the expanded collection of social 
indicators. The reach of the concept may be seen in signatories to the ‘Istanbul 
Declaration’ – the OECD, European Commission, Organisation of Islamic Conference, 
UN, UNDP and World Bank – who called on domestic statistical offices in member 
countries to develop their social indicators to allow better understandings of ‘societal 
wellbeing’ [Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, (2007), p.1]. 
As a political discourse, ‘well-being’ is being used normatively; it is a good to be 
worked towards and secured. This is most apparent in Cameron (2010, np) who, quoting 
Robert Kennedy, notes that GDP “measures everything… except that which makes life 
worthwhile” [Kennedy, (1968), np]. “How we are doing as a nation”, Cameron argues 
cannot be read from GDP alone; instead we should be counting whatever it is ‘that makes 
life worthwhile’ (ibid., np). GDP stands as a description of market-based activities, which 
constitute only a small part of life, and treats these as an end in themselves, equating 
increased market-based activity with improved social outcomes. The suggestion of the 
well-being movement is that ‘well-being’ is a higher end than GDP, for which GDP is 
necessary but not sufficient. By going ‘beyond GDP’ (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2009) to directly measure aspects of the social, GDP can be resituated 
within political discourse as instrumental to ‘well-being’ rather than as constitutive of it 
(see also Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2013b; United 
Nations General Assembly, 2012) 
This normative argument is very closely bound up with ideas of ‘development’ or 
‘progress’. In launching the UK programme, Cameron claimed it to be a means of 
“measuring our progress as a country” by “how our lives are improving” [Cameron, 
(2010), np]; foregrounding development as the target of observations above and beyond 
GDP. The Istanbul Declaration goes further, affirming a “commitment to measuring and 
fostering the progress of societies in all their dimensions and to supporting initiatives at 
the country level”; the expanded framework of indicators beyond the merely economic 
being here both observer and facilitator of societal development [Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development, (2007), p.1]. 
In joining social indicators with ‘progress’, the well-being movement has an affinity 
with critiques of modes of development and economic development which are based 
around GDP growth, such as those posed by the ‘post-development’ literature (see for 
recent reviews of the field, Andrews and Dawa, 2014; McEwan, 2008). These critiques 
share the arguments of the well-being movement about the limitations of GDP, noting the 
harm and upheaval that economic development policies have had on populations in the 
Global South. By shifting away from GDP as an over-riding aim of policy, ‘well-being’ 
appears to open up space for theorists and practitioners to think about ‘developments’, of 
different ways of balancing economic, social and cultural aims, setting economic 
interventions in and on the Global South against locally determined needs and objectives. 
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As such it stands as a both critique of the neoclassical economics which dominates 
economic development theory and practice (Fine, 2009) and of the underlying teleology 
and cultural superiority inherent in the concept of ‘development’ itself (Esteva, 1992). 
It is, however, unlikely that the move to ‘well-being’ will lead to a move away from 
standard models of economic development. The reason for this is the gap between the 
normative aim of ‘well-being’ and the descriptive statistical frameworks proposed as aids 
to pursuing it. The political discourses of the Global North have resulted in a cluster of 
closely-related statistical programmes: in the UK, at European level and by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (Eurostat, 2008; Office for 
National Statistics, 2014; Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 
2013b). These programmes developed in dialogue with each other, sharing policy actors 
in their development (Bache, 2013; Bache and Reardon, 2013; Jenkins, 2016), and 
provide a structural model which is shaping efforts in other Northern nations and being 
promoted as a tool for Southern nations (see Boarini et al., 2014; Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2013b). These programmes take the form of 
national aggregate dashboards, in which a series of measures taken at varying scales are 
aggregated to the national-level, producing a set of discrete indicators. This contrasts with 
the leading model from the Global South, Bhutan’s ‘Gross National Happiness’ (see Ura 
et al., 2012), which sums indicators at the individual level, producing a national measure 
of how many individuals have or do not have ‘well-being’. 
In all four of these programmes (UK, European, OECD and Bhutanese), the abstract 
concept ‘well-being’ is constructed as a closed set of quantities, some of which are 
themselves concretisations of abstract concepts (such as ‘happiness’). Like all 
reductionisms, it claims an equatability of qualities based on essential features.  
‘Well-being’ is here a universal feature of nations (and its subcomponents are universal 
features of individuals) which exists independently of context, place, history, aims, 
values, structural conditions and inequalities: all of these are outside of ‘well-being’ and 
are relevant only in as far as they interact with measures which comprise it. The subject 
of ‘well-being’ is equally irrelevant: because ‘well-being’ is the same across nations; it 
does not matter to the framework who is doing well or ill, and how they are doing it is 
defined entirely in terms of the movement of quantities within the framework. This is 
particularly the case in the Northern frameworks, where national well-being is 
constructed of independent measures of well-being, and not of individuals with  
‘well-being’. ‘Well-being’ is not defined in relation to the particularities or experiential 
lives of individuals and collectives, but solely in generalities. Questions of who has  
ill-being, relative to what standards, and for what reason, lie outside of the framework’s 
concerns. 
At the same time, the multiplicity of sub-measures allows for a limited flexibility of 
conceptions: there may be multiple ‘well-beings’ read from the indicators of the 
framework. Nations are allowed to be happy but poor. However, these readings are 
limited by the contents of the framework. The poverty and the happiness are able to give 
context to each other, but stand divorced from any wider concerns. Beyond explanations 
in terms of statistical relations with each other, the why of the happiness or poverty is 
opaque. ‘Well-being’ becomes a matter of mechanical interactions between its 
components and only its components. 
From this, all that appears to be being proposed in the movement towards  
‘well-being’ measurement is a shift from one technocratic and reductive measurement 
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framework to another. ‘Well-being’ is left with much the same structural logic as Escobar 
criticised in ‘development’, “a top-down, ethnocentric and technocratic approach, which 
treat[s] people and cultures as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be moved up and 
down in the charts of ‘progress’” [Escobar, (1994), p.44]. The descriptive amount is 
being confounded with the normative good, and multiple potential ways of being are 
being collapsed into a small set of universal common ‘well-beings’ (Latouche, 1992). 
3 Well-being is a chaotic conception 
On the argument of the previous section, ‘well-being’ frameworks construct ‘well-being’ 
as an abstract but universal object, made up of other universal objects; as a construct 
which is equatable across contexts, made up of items equatable across contexts. Is  
‘well-being’ amenable to such a construction? The present section will suggest that it is 
not: that ‘well-being’ is an evaluative state which cannot be defined independently of the 
aims and values of its holder and that attempts to do so produce a construction which is 
incoherent and unintelligible. 
The first thing which suggests such a conclusion is the difficulty measurement 
frameworks have in specifying what the ‘well-being’ that they are measuring actually is. 
At the most abstract level, ‘well-being’ (as in Office for National Statistics, 2014) 
becomes ‘quality of life’ (as in Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development, 2013a) and ‘progress’ (as in United Nations General Assembly, 2012). 
These terms are nebulously defined: either by exclusion, as in the case of the European 
programme which seeks merely to ‘go Beyond GDP’ by measuring non-economic factors 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2009) or by reference to equally undefined 
or unspecified properties [Cameron (2010, np), for example, suggests that the well-being 
is a measure of, among other things, ‘our quality of life’, the thing which the OECD set 
out to measure specifically]. Often, there is no attempt at a definition at all: the UK 
Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) Measuring National Well-Being programme aims at 
being “an accepted and trusted set of National Statistics which help people understand 
and monitor well-being”, but does so through “looking at different areas of national  
well-being such as health, relationships, job satisfaction” [Office for National Statistics, 
(2014), p.52]. There is a definitional regress here, national well-being merely being the 
total of areas of national well-being, the concept being defined in terms of its shopping 
list of components. That is, what constitutes ‘well-being’ is whatever is thought to 
constitute ‘well-being’; the abstract concept itself does not imply any definite qualities or 
abilities, so a concretised concept is stood in its stead. 
The history of these conceptions gives some explanation of this vagueness.  
‘Well-being’, in one form or another, has been a concern of philosophy since at least (in 
the Global North) the Ancient Greeks [Aristotle (1886) is often cited, particularly in 
justifying self-report measures of ‘flourishing’ as a ‘well-being’ component; see Allin 
and Hand, 2014]. This is a fact often observed by promoters of well-being as a way of 
grounding programmes or calls for programmes as being reasonable (see, for instance, 
O’Donnell et al., 2014), but what they tend not to note is that the debate was never 
resolved (White, 2006). Ideas of what constitutes a ‘good’, ‘flourishing’ or ‘worthwhile’ 
life (and it may be noted, again, a terminological vagueness and potential disagreement 
amongst such terms) still range widely, from the utilitarian principles of neoclassical 
economics (see Layard, 2005) to the deontological underpinnings of human rights theory 
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(Griffin, 2008). While not showing that a definition is unachievable (although this, too, is 
a defensible philosophical position; see Rorty, 1980), this historic and ongoing lack of 
agreement at least suggests that opinions on the matter are liable to differ. 
In research on ‘well-being’, there are at least six distinct constructs which appear 
across the literature as potential components. The most novel three in terms of 
measurement programmes come under the heading ‘subjective well-being’: self-report 
measures of positive and negative affect (normally happiness and anxiety), satisfaction 
with life and ‘eudaimonia’ (a consideration of whether life is ‘fulfilling’ or ‘worthwhile’). 
These approaches are popular with economists who see them as a means of directly 
capturing utility independently of market activity, and so a means of pricing non-market 
interventions in terms of the ‘satisfaction’ they bring (see, particularly, Layard, 2005). It 
is worth noting, however, that there are three distinct constructs here – satisfaction, 
affectual condition and sense of fulfilment – which do not collapse in to each other 
(Diener and Seligman, 2004). It is also possible to ask for subjective evaluations of entire 
domains of human experience, such as ‘society’, or of external objects, such as ‘the 
government’. This approach allows consideration of how individuals and collectives feel 
about their wider environment, whether they are in a world which is satisfying  
(Berger-Schmitt and Noll, 2000). Positive mental functioning has been distinguished 
from affect as a fifth construct, arguing that ‘well-being’ is about more than merely 
avoiding ill-being (Huppert et al., 2008; Stewart-Brown et al., 2011). Finally, there is 
what might be considered the traditional approach of observing and counting particular 
aspects of life, such as life expectancy or GDP. The Millennium Development Goals fit 
into this conception of well-being: areas selected for observation and intervention 
because they are seen as beneficial or harmful to the ability of individuals and collectives 
to live and function well (United Nations General Assembly, 2000). 
That each of these six can sensibly fit into a conception of ‘well-being’ suggests that 
‘well-being’ is something akin to ‘doing well’. Such a broad construction, however, 
offers no limitation on what might be included; in the manner of the UK Office for 
National Statistics, above, it asks only for good things and the exclusion of bad things. 
But what counts as a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ in this sense can only be defined relative to a set of 
aims and values; while there may be basic preconditions to ‘doing well’, such as being 
alive, these are minimal and themselves are subject to limitations connected with aims 
and objectives (that is, there may come a point where being alive is no longer a ‘good’ 
thing). Beyond this, any measures become profoundly ambivalent: even where there may 
be broad agreement about contribution to well-being (premature death or extreme 
poverty, for instance, are probably non-controversially detrimental to well-being), the 
point at which sufficiency is reached and, potentially, levels become harmful will be 
debated. 
This is typified by the UK framework (Office for National Statistics, 2014), where a 
public debate provided a majoritarian underpinning for the general areas thought to 
comprise well-being (see Matheson, 2011) and the Office for National Statistics 
themselves selected mainly from existing and available statistics to ‘fit’ these areas. The 
result sees the public sector debt-to-GDP ratio sitting alongside inflation and real net 
national income per head in the ‘economy’ domain; three measures which will mean very 
different things to those of different aims, values and positions within society. The 
defined measurement set thus provides multiple objects; aims and values are mediating a 
large but limited number of possible ‘well-beings’ within the set. 
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The critical realist Andrew Sayer’s idea of a ‘chaotic conception’ is useful in 
describing the ambiguities and complexities which ‘well-being’ exhibits. Borrowing from 
Marx (1993), he defined a chaotic conception as an abstraction which groups together 
disparate and potentially contradictory aspects of the world into a single concept which 
appears to have unity and autonomous force [Sayer, (1982), p.72, 1981, 2000]. Such 
conceptions abound in the social sciences and, indeed, in this paper: ‘economic 
development’, for one, draws together ideas of wealth, integration in the world economy, 
industrial development, domestic infrastructure and so on (many of which, themselves, 
are chaotic catch-alls for disparate and uneven entities and concepts). Sayer argued that 
such conceptions were unhelpful, leading us to ask the wrong questions, questions about 
monoliths which were, ultimately, illusory. ‘Well-being’ is also a chaotic conception. In 
shifting from the abstract normative concept to the descriptive concretisation, the 
evaluative aspect of the concept has been lost. What was a judgement based on aims and 
values has become a judgement based on the movement of indicators with no theoretical 
linkages between them other than they are considered by the programme designers to be 
‘good’ in some way. 
To illustrate with a simple example: what are the relative well-beings of two nations, 
one with low GDP and high subjective well-being, the other with high GDP and low 
subjective well-being? It might be said that they both have room for improvement, so the 
question can be recast: at what point would an increase in GDP or subjective well-being 
be offset by a fall in the other? On what criteria would such a decision be based? The 
claim to ‘well-being’ is that there is something, ‘well-being’, which is changing with the 
movements of its components. So how is it changing? There is a difficulty here in the 
equation or relation of unlike measures within a single framework, which bodes ill for the 
use of well-being frameworks as a guide to action; it is not clear when an intervention 
would be necessary, or how it would balance against impacts on other measures. 
Extending this, there is a further difficulty in equating or relating unlike patterns of 
measurements across individuals and collectives. Any assessment made of the conditions 
of another is necessarily subjective, made from a particular standpoint of aims and 
objectives. A nation doing well by its own standards may not do well by those of another. 
Bhutan is a good example of this, with its focus on happiness in part in defiance of a 
persistently low level of GDP. Such problems of comparison make it difficult even to use 
frameworks to interpret the conditions of other nations, or to judge whether interventions 
have been ‘successful’ or not. 
This chaos creates problems for the articulation of ‘well-being’ in a measurement 
framework. It was argued in the previous section that the framework reconstitutes the 
abstract notion of ‘well-being’ as a concrete, technical problem. But if the notion of 
‘well-being’ is evaluative, and so is unintelligible independently of a particular set of 
aims and values, there can be no single framework or interpretation of a framework. This 
is as true within a nation or collective as it is between them. This leaves an inconsistency 
at the heart of the measurement frameworks: as multi-item sets, they allow that there are 
multiple ways in which an individual or collective can thrive, but, at the same time, they 
set boundaries on which ways are permissible. In doing so, they accept a multiplicity of 
views while ruling some views out of bounds. The promise held out by the measurement 
framework is thus unachievable: ‘well-being’ as an abstract evaluative state can only be 
reduced to a set of quantities at the expense of ignoring its evaluative nature and so 
ignoring at least some of its components. Whatever a nation, collective or individual 
believes ‘well-being’ to be (if, in fact, they have such a conception), they are offered the 
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inter-relation of a small number of concrete measures, as determined by the author of the 
framework. It should be noted that this is true no matter what measures are included, and 
would be as true of a framework based around, for example, Sen’s capabilities (Sen, 
1989), as it is of the Northern frameworks discussed. 
To answer the question of how well-being measurement may influence economic 
development policy, then, first it needs to be asked whose conception of well-being will 
be measured. Whose interests and pre-conceptions will be reflected? And who will 
determine how the pattern of measures will be interpreted? 
4 The concept of ‘well-being’ is not novel in economic development policy 
or practice 
The argument above may be accepted, but felt to be doing too much. ‘Well-being’ may 
be indefinable, and the measurement sets around it at best approximations, but the latter 
may still be helpful in establishing alternative aims and objectives as being on a par with 
economic concerns such as GDP growth. On this reading, it does not matter that  
‘well-being’ cannot be fully captured; the fact that it is now being considered at all within 
policy is a step forward. The existence of frameworks ensures a salience for matters like 
subjective well-being which they previously did not have, allowing the impact of 
economic development policy to be more fully considered. 
Such a hope is simultaneously over-optimistic and over-pessimistic. Its pessimism 
stems from the implicit claim that well-being is not something already considered by 
policy makers and others involved in economic development. As Fujiwara and Campbell 
(2011) observed, writing for the UK Treasury to defend their incorporation of  
‘well-being’ into government cost-benefit analyses, this is not the case. The focus on 
growth, both in the Global North and in its economic development policies, is predicated 
on the assumption that growth is a good thing instrumentally, that it will improve the 
lives who live under it. Nor was growth an overriding aim: governments were aware of 
non-economic metrics of human life and capable of balancing them against longer-term 
aims of economic development. This can be seen in the prior existence of social statistics 
which new well-being frameworks have joined together, and in initiatives such as the 
Millennium Development Goals. Policy makers were concerned with well-being, even if 
they were not formally labelling and tracking it as such. If this is true, though, there is 
reason to doubt the optimism of the claim: if policy makers and other developers already 
considered well-being in some form yet still produced the policies they have done, what 
difference would a formal framework make? 
To put this question another way: would the existence of well-being frameworks have 
changed previous schemes for economic development? The case can be made that they 
would not, using the history of actually existing schemes such as structural adjustment 
policies (SAPs) and their successors, poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). These 
two sets of interventions act as good test cases of the limitations of ‘well-being’ in 
shaping policy: not only have they been the largest and most systematic economic 
intervention by the Global North in the Global South in the 35-or-so years since they 
were first developed, but they are accompanied by a wealth of research showing that they 
are actively harmful to what is now being considered ‘well-being’. Numerous studies 
have noted declines in levels of health (de Vogli, 2011; Hoddie and Hartzell, 2014), 
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increases in infant mortality (Coburn et al., 2015; Shandra et al., 2012) and maternal 
mortality (Pandolfelli et al., 2014), reduction in the status and freedoms of women 
(Summerfield and Aslanbeigui, 1998), reductions in access to human rights (Abouharb 
and Cingranelli, 2009), and growth in inequality (Oberdabernig, 2013) related to the 
imposition of SAPs and PRSPs. These harms fall most heavily on the most vulnerable: 
van de Walle (2001), for instance, shows how adjustment policies have been 
implemented in sub-Saharan Africa in such as way as to secure the position of elites even 
as they damage the interests of broader societal groups. Such studies suggest a great 
potential for a well-being framework: had these harms been visible, as they would have 
been if tracked in national ‘well-being’ programmes, the policy may have been adjusted. 
The problem with such an argument is that the harms were visible (Jolly, 1991). 
Vetterlein (2008) and Grawe (2013) in their histories of SAPs note that international 
finance institutions were aware of these criticisms, but that their initial reactions was to 
deny the relevance of these harms: at best, they were short-term blips on the road to a 
better future, at worst they were irrelevant, outside the aims and scopes of the economic 
development project. Such an argument could still be made in the context of a well-being 
framework: witness the programmes of austerity which have run alongside the 
development of well-being frameworks in the Global North, programmes which are 
predicated on ideas of pain now to avoid more pain later [indeed, Cameron (2010, np) is 
keen to emphasise that well-being will not prove a distraction from austerity]. 
The political pressure deepened in the early 1990s, with the UN Development 
Programme moving to establish a set of objective measures of well-being in the form of 
the Human Development Index (Jolly, 1991). While this led to the World Bank and, later, 
International Monetary Fund relaxing somewhat their restrictions on the provision of 
social safety nets, the macro-economic policies, and the damage they caused, were left 
fundamentally unchanged. When the structural adjustment programmes were overhauled 
in the late 1990s, it was not because of the substantial body of evidence of the harms they 
caused, but because they appeared not to work on their own terms (World Bank, 1996). 
Their replacements, PRSPs, have fared little better. As Dijkstra (2011), Fraser (2005), 
Lazarus (2008) and Levinsohn (2003) have noted, the promise that these would be 
participatory projects in which recipient governments would shape the structural 
adjustment they would undertake has not been met. While there has been some local 
input into sectoral and micro-economic plans, the macro-economic outlines of the 
programmes are the same as under the SAP regime (Guimarães and Avendaño, 2011). 
The only real difference between the two is that ‘participation’ now accompanies 
‘development’ and ‘poverty’ as a neutrally constructed universal, subject to technical 
solutions (Cornwall and Brock, 2005). 
This story of economic development and social harm has been played out across the 
Global South. To take an example, Ghana entered its first structural adjustment plan in 
1983 under the military dictatorship of Jerry Rawlings. Partly due to the increased scope 
the authoritarian regime had relative to democratic governments, the plan was 
implemented more-or-less faithfully and Ghana quickly became seen as a SAP success 
story (Konadu-Agyemang, 2001a). It largely achieved its aims of economic growth, 
reduced inflation and reduced government expenditure. However, it did so at the cost of 
turning Ghana into a ‘neocolonial economy’ [Dzorgbo, (2001), p.291], marked by high 
unemployment and under-employment (Konadu-Agyemang, 2001a), declining human 
capital as health and education services were taken out of the financial reach of most 
citizens, environmental despoilation as the economy oriented itself around primary 
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resource extraction (Donkor, 1997), increased child labour (Hutchful, 2002), rural 
poverty (Weissman, 1990) and urban housing affordability issues (Konadu-Agyemang, 
2001b). These social problems were apparent beyond the academic literature. In 1988, 
they were sufficient that an anti-poverty programme was introduced, explicitly as a 
palliative; the regime agreed it only when additional external funding could be secured 
from international donors and on the condition that no changes would be made to the 
implementation of the SAP. The half-heartedness of this programme, and the weakness of 
its achievements, led one commentator to describe it as “a gargantuan political fraud 
inflicted on the people of Ghana by the government and its international backers” 
[Donkor, (1997), pp.239–240]. 
5 ‘Well-being’ as a ‘fuzzword’ 
As a final attempt to salvage well-being frameworks, it could be argued that, regardless 
of what measure is finally targeted, the presence of a framework which includes even 
basic measures of the social beyond the economic provides the space to discuss and 
debate priorities. For instance, by tracking subjective well-being alongside GDP, it is 
possible to make the argument that GDP should not be the aim of policy, or that it should 
be approached in a different way. 
There are a number of reasons why we might be cautious of this. One is the position 
of the Millennium Development Goals discussed above: it is already possible to talk 
about the impacts of economic policy on lives in the Global South, there is a specialised 
and highly visible framework to allow it, and it has not led to a change in  
macro-economic policy at the level of institutional lenders despite such policies 
potentially impeding the development goals (Fehling et al., 2013). It is hard to believe 
that such aims will become any more of a priority when grouped alongside economic 
measures; rather this would seem to equate the economic and the non-economic, 
encouraging an assessment of the social in economic terms. At the same time, the 
privileging of particular measures within a framework limits the visibility of measures 
left out of the framework making it harder to talk about, for instance, structural or 
contextual concerns such as the justice of international debt or trade relations, or histories 
of colonial and neo-colonial exploitation. 
More pressing, however, is the track record of other normative concepts that have 
been brought into the wider development discourse. Cornwall and Brock (2005) examine 
a number of similarly abstract ‘fuzzwords’ in contemporary development discourse 
(‘poverty reduction’, ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’) arguing that their usefulness to 
policy makers arises from their ability to hide multiple meanings inside an 
unimpeachable normative container. They establish universal, but ill-defined (I would say 
‘chaotic’) concepts, which are as hard to oppose as they are to specify. That difficulty in 
opposition transfers to the expression of the vague universal; ‘poverty reduction’ as 
expressed is protected because no one can oppose ‘poverty reduction’ in principle. ‘Well-
being’ acts in exactly the same way. The rhetoric of well-being, the sentiment behind it, 
is almost impossible to oppose; such opposition would stand as a claim that people 
should be worse off. A well-being framework, however, is not the abstract sentiment but 
a particular expression of it: the technocratic measurement of aspects of life 
masquerading as a universal and placeless principle. 
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The result of this may not be to provide us with new ways of talking about harm, and 
thus ways of securing ‘well-being’, but new ways of recasting harm as positive. An old 
example of this sort of linguistic slight-of-hand can be seen in Article 22 of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations which justified the colonial rule by Northern powers of peoples 
formerly ruled by the Ottomans on “the principle that the well-being and development of 
such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation” (Manley, 1931). The explicit link here 
between ‘well-being’ and ‘development’ prefigures that of modern frameworks, and 
utilises both to justify the extension of regimes of paternalistic expropriation and 
oppression (itself recast as ‘civilisation’). The inequality of power between the subject 
and the ruling nations, and any difference in definition as to what constitutes  
‘well-being’, is obscured by the appeal to universal principals. 
Contemporaneously, we can see a similar process in Bhutan, whose policy of Gross 
National Happiness is fêted in policy and academic circles for ‘doing development 
differently’ (for a typical paean, see Burns, 2011). Over the last 20 years, Bhutan’s 
economy has increased in size, in part because of the development of a hydro-electric 
power sector in the South of the country. This has been accompanied by the systematic 
oppression of the ethnic Nepalese minority who live in the south: starting with an  
anti-miscegenation law, the Marriage Act of 1980, the Nepalese have been denied 
citizenship, deported or harried out of the country, denied the right to educate their 
children in their own language, denied cultural autonomy in their dress and denied access 
to much of the labour market and most state benefits; at one point an estimated 140,000 
lived in refugee camps in Nepal and India (Human Rights Watch, 2007; for a more recent 
figure, which takes into account refuge settlement outside of Bhutan, see UNHCR, 2016; 
see also Rizal, 2004; de Varennes, 2008). This oppression has run alongside the  
better-advertised policy of Gross National Happiness. Not only does Gross National 
Happiness act as marketing which distracts attention from this policy of ethnic cleansing, 
it is tied to it: one of the programme’s indicators relates to homogeneity of cultural 
identity, meaning that an improvement in the index comes at the direct expense of the 
Nepalese who must assimilate (a task made more difficult by denial of citizenship and 
restrictions on access to civil society) or leave. The rhetoric of well-being and the  
high-level of the programme serve to both hide and justify oppression. In the same way 
as the SAP, the harm is already considered permissible, ‘well-being’ gives a new way in 
which to talk about it. 
This example may be considered extreme, but in light of the discussion above we 
might consider other questions elided by the Gross National Happiness framework. When 
the measurement was introduced in 1972, and for the subsequent 36 years, the country 
was an autocracy, offering little or no democratic freedom to its population. Speaking in 
2013, the newly elected Prime Minister highlighted a number of areas from which Gross 
National Happiness was something of a ‘distraction’: “our ballooning debt that if we’re 
not careful will not be sustainable; the big rupee shortage; unemployment, in particular 
youth unemployment; and a perception of growing corruption” [Tobgay, quoted in BBC 
(2013)]. Neither Bhutan’s programme nor those in the Global North consider suicide: the 
World Health Organisation suggests that Bhutan’s rate, 17.8 per 100,000 people in 2012, 
is one of the highest in the world (World Health Organisation, 2016; the rate for refugees 
from Bhutan to the USA, 21.5, and in refugee camps, 20.7, are even higher; Centre for 
Disease Control, 2013). It is not my purpose here to suggest that measures of democratic 
engagement, debt, unemployment, perceptions of corruption or suicide should be taken as 
measures of ‘development’, ‘progress’ or ‘national success’, nor to suggest that  
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‘well-being’ frameworks should include them. The point here is that these, on the account 
of Gross National Happiness, are not to do with happiness, the success of the nation, or 
anything else. They are not counted, and they do not count. The existence of the 
framework is limiting what can be talked about. 
Fuzzwords of Cornwall and Brook’s kind suggest that problems and their solutions 
are neutral: there is ‘well-being’ and it can be brought about through a balancing of 
policies. However, as they argue (2005, p.1056), “the terms we use are never neutral”: 
there is a power-relation between the person who gets to define the concept and the one 
who has that definition imposed on them. The statistic is never neutral either. It, too, 
reflects a series of power relations and decisions about who gets counted, what aspects of 
their lives are counted, what weight is given to those aspects, and so on. It is necessarily 
reductive, and decisions are made about what is left out. However, it stands as a 
statement of what is: just as GDP is blind to happiness, the national levels of well-being 
are blind to anything outside of the measures they include. These are not counted, and do 
not count. Similarly, they are largely blind to distributional issues: unless specifically 
observed, the variations in levels according to scale, location, gender, ethnicity, class, 
social grouping, and so on are lost in a national picture. They are not counted, and do not 
count. 
This is true not only in the Global South, but more generally. As Gaventa (1998) 
points out, the ‘North’ is no more homogeneous than the ‘South’ is, it has its regions of 
historically and structurally-determined and -enforced disadvantage. These are the areas 
in which well-being is arguably normatively most pressing; areas of vulnerable people, 
deprived of access to the labour market, to amenities, to state services, with lower life 
expectancies, higher morbidity, lower educational levels. These are all areas counted by 
Northern well-being frameworks, but they are also all areas which were counted prior to 
the well-being frameworks existing. The existence of the framework does not change the 
power relations between these subaltern populations and the markets and states they exist 
within and alongside. In many cases, the framework acts to further marginalise 
populations, by burying their pockets of ill-being beneath bland national averages. 
It is this model which we are considering when asking whether well-being 
measurement can bring better economic development. It should be clear that any hope 
that a move away from GDP might lead to development based around the desires and 
needs of Global South is unlikely to be achieved in this way. The statistical logic of 
measurement does not interfere with the model logic of economic development or of 
development more generally. It does not challenge the power relations inherent in the 
development process, particularly where ‘development’ and ‘well-being’ are being 
defined by the same people, as they currently are in the Global North (and, as I write this, 
I am painfully aware of the fact that I am a scholar from the Global North, writing in a 
journal in the Global North, about whether we can or should extend our current pet 
epistemology to the Global South. Who are we to ask such questions?). 
6 Conclusions: taking well-being seriously means not counting it 
This paper has argued that the measuring of ‘well-being’ necessarily misdefines it, 
attempting to separate an evaluative state from the grounds of its evaluation, compressing 
it into the statistical interaction of meaning-free metrics. In doing so, it produces an 
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unresolvable melange of measures, open and liable to determination by those holding 
power. It also produces a rhetorical language which obscures and justifies the conduct of 
that power. 
This may feel something of an extreme conclusion, given the normative force of 
‘well-being’ as a concept. However, if that normative force is to be taken seriously, there 
needs to be a less mediocre response than merely counting discrete aspects of human 
existence and attempting to relate them statistically. What ‘well-being’ offers is an 
indication of the inherent contradiction of social statistics: that they can operate only by 
reducing the social to the mechanical. If the social is the object of interest, as ‘well-being’ 
movement suggests it should be, there needs to be a social way of examining it. To take 
‘well-being’ seriously there needs to be dialogue which addresses the complex grounds 
on which the assessment of ‘well-being’ is being made. As a starting point, that is going 
to mean talking to those in the Global South about how they conceptualise their  
‘well-being’, and about how this interacts with their hopes for ‘development’; moving 
away from models of concrete and defined universals and towards richer, narrative 
accounts. 
One potential model for such work is ‘participatory development’, in the sense 
discussed by Hickey and Mohan (2005). Reviewing earlier work, they suggested that 
much which went under the name of ‘participation’ was technocratic, top-down and 
exclusionary in the manner of PRSPs discussed above, with ‘participation’ serving as 
another fuzzword obscuring Northern interventionism (Cornell and Brook, 2005). They 
argue that for participatory development to be successful, it needs to be grounded in 
notions of citizenship which extends democratic access to marginalised groups. Such a 
conception is broader than the teleological conception of ‘development’ and ‘progress’ 
implied by technocratic measurement frameworks, recognising those who are to 
‘progress’ as individuals with agency. As such agency encompasses views about  
‘well-being’, participatory approaches provide a potential alternative starting point to 
build developments which take well-being seriously. 
Acknowledgements 
The author is funded by the ESRC, grant number ES/J50082/1. My gratitude and thanks 
to Andy Pike, Joe Painter and, particularly, Mike Coombes for their constructive 
comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am also very grateful for the attention of 
Parviz Dabir-Alai and three anonymous reviewers, whose contributions improved the 
submitted version of the text. Any errors or omissions that remain I claim for myself. 
References 
Abouharb, M.R. and Cingranelli, D.L. (2009) ‘IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003’, 
Review of International Organizations, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp.47–72. 
Allin, P. and Hand, D.J. (2014) The Wellbeing of Nations; Meaning, Motive and Measurement, 
John Wiley and Sons, Oxford. 
Andrews, N. and Dawa, S. (2014) ‘A post-development hoax? (Re)-examining the past, present and 
future of development studies’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 6, pp.922–938. 
Aristotle (1886) The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., London. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Reasons to be cautious about ‘well-being’ in economic development 121    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Bache, I. (2013) ‘Measuring quality of life for public policy: an idea whose time has come? 
Agenda-setting dynamics in the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy,  
Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.21–38. 
Bache, I. and Reardon, L. (2013) ‘An idea whose time has come? Explaining the rise of well-being 
in British politics’, Political Studies, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp.898–914. 
BBC (2013) Bhutan PM Casts Doubts over Gross National Happiness [online] 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23545641 (accessed 13 February 2016). 
Berger-Schmitt, R. and Noll, H-H. (2000) Conceptual Framework and Structure of a European 
System of Social Indicators, Centre for Survey Research and Methodology, Mannheim. 
Boarini, R., Kolev, A. and McGregor, A. (2014) Measuring Well-Being and Progress in Countries 
at Different Stages of Development: Towards a More Universal Conceptual Framework, 
OECD, Paris. 
Burns, G. (2011) ‘Gross National Happiness: a gift from Bhutan to the world’, in Biswas-Diener, 
R. (Ed.): Positive Psychology as Social Change, pp.73–87, Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht. 
Cameron, D. (2010) PM Speech on Wellbeing [online] http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pm-
speech-on-well-being/ (accessed 22 October 2012). 
Centre for Disease Control (2013) Suicide and Suicidal Ideation among Bhutanese Refugees – 
United States, 2009–2012 [online] http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ 
mm6226a2.htm (accessed 13 February 2016). 
Coburn, C., Restivo, M. and Shandra, J.M. (2015) ‘The African Development Bank and infant 
mortality: a cross-national analysis of structural adjustment and investment lending from 1990 
to 2006’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. 56, Nos. 3–4, pp.275–296. 
Commission of the European Communities (2009) GDP and Beyond: Measuring Progress in a 
Changing World, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels. 
Cornwall, A. and Brock, K. (2005) ‘What do buzzwords do for development policy? A critical look 
at ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘poverty reduction’’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, 
No. 7, pp.1043–1060. 
de Varennes, F. (2008) ‘Constitutionalising discrimination in Bhutan: the emasculation of human 
rights in the Land of the Dragon’, Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 9, 
No. 2, pp.47–76. 
de Vogli, R. (2011) ‘Neoliberal globalisation and health in a time of economic crisis’, Social 
Theory and Health, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp.311–325. 
Diener, E. and Seligman, M.E. (2004) ‘Beyond money; toward an economy of well-being’, 
Psychological Science in the Public Interest, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp.1–31. 
Dijkstra, G. (2011) ‘The PRSP appraoch and the illusion of improved aid effectiveness: lessons 
from Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua’, Development Policy Review, Vol. 29, No. s1, 
pp.s111–s133. 
Donkor, K. (1997) Structural Adjustment and Mass Poverty in Ghana, Ashgate, Aldershot. 
Dzorgbo, D.S. (2001) Ghana in Search of Development: The Challenge of Governance, Economic 
Management and Institution Building, Ashgate, Aldershot. 
Escobar, A. (1994) Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Esteva, G. (1992) ‘Development’, in Sachs, W. (Ed.): The Development Dictionary: A Guide to 
Knowledge as Power, pp.6–25, Zed Books, London. 
European Economic and Social Committee (2012) ‘Opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee on ‘GDP and beyond – the involvement of civil society in choosing 
complementary indicators’ (own-initiative opinion)’, Official Journal of the European Union, 
C 181/04, pp.14–20. 
European Parliament (2011) GDP and Beyond – Measuring Progress in a Changing World: 
Resolution of 8 June 2011, European Parliament, Brussels. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   122 M. Jenkins    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
European Statistical System Committee (2011) Sponsorship Group on Measuring Progress,  
Well-Being and Sustainable Development: Final Report, ESSC, Luxembourg. 
Eurostat (2008) Feasibility Study for Well-Being Indicators: Task 4: Critical Review, Eurostat, 
Luxembourg. 
Fehling, M., Nelson, B.D. and Venkatapuram, S. (2013) ‘Limitations of the millennium 
development goals: a literature review’, Global Public Health, Vol. 8, No. 10, pp.1109–1122. 
Fine, B. (2009) ‘Development as zombieconomics in the age of neoliberalism’, Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 5, pp.885–904. 
Fraser, A. (2005) ‘Poverty reduction strategy papers: now who calls the shots?’, Review of African 
Political Economy, Vol. 32, Nos. 104-105, pp.317–340. 
Fujiwara, D. and Campbell, R. (2011) Valuation Techniques for Social Cost-Benefit Analysis: 
Stated Preference, Revealed Preference and Subjective Well-Being Approaches; A Discussion 
of the Current Issues, HM Treasury, London. 
G20 (2009) G20 Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit [online] http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/ 
2009/2009communique0925.html (accessed 4 June 2014). 
Gaventa, J. (1998) ‘Poverty, participation and social exclusion in north and south’, IDS Bulletin, 
Vol. 29, No. 1, pp.50–57. 
Grawe, R. (2013) Innovation at the World Bank: Selective Perspectives over Three Decades  
1975–2005, UNI World Institute for Development Economic Research, Helsinki. 
Griffin, J. (2008) On Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Guimarães, J.P. and Avendaño, N. (2011) ‘The great experiment: testing the PRSP approach in 
Nicaragua, 2000–2007’, European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 23, No. 2,  
pp.319–336. 
Hickey, S. and Mohan, G. (2005) ‘Relocating participation within a radical politics of 
development’, Development and Change, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp.237–262. 
Hoddie, M. and Hartzell, C.A. (2014) ‘Short-term pain, long-term gain? The effects of IMF 
economic reform programs on public health performance’, Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 95, 
No. 4, pp.1022–1042. 
Human Rights Watch (2007) Last Hope: The Need for Durable Solutions for Bhutanese Refugees 
in Nepal and India, Human Rights Watch, New York. 
Huppert, F.A., Marks, N., Clark, A. et al. (2008) Measuring Well-Being across Europe: 
Description of the ESS Well-Being Module and Preliminary Findings, Paris School of 
Economics, Paris. 
Hutchful, E. (2002) Ghana’s Adjustment Experience: The Paradox of Reform, United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Department, Geneva. 
Jenkins, M. (2016) Understanding Official Statistic-Making as a Social Process: The UK 
‘Measuring National Well-being’ Programme, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Newcastle. 
Jolly, R. (1991) ‘Adjustment with a human face: a UNICEF record and perspective on the 1980s’, 
World Development, Vol. 19, No. 12, pp.1807–1821. 
Kennedy, R.F. (1968) Remarks at the University of Kansas, 18 March [online] 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/RFK-Speeches/Remarks-
of-Robert-F-Kennedy-at-the-University-of-Kansas-March-18-1968.aspx (accessed 7 April 
2013). 
Konadu-Agyemang, K. (2001a) ‘Africa under World Bank/IMF management: the best of times and 
the worst of times’, inKonadu-Agyemang, K. (Ed.): IMF and World Bank Sponsored 
Structural Adjustment Programs in Africa: Ghana’s Experience, 1983–1999, pp.427–434, 
Ashgate, Aldershot. 
Konadu-Agyemang, K. (2001b) ‘Structural adjustment programs and housing affordability in 
Accra, Ghana’, The Canadian Geographer, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp.528–544. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Reasons to be cautious about ‘well-being’ in economic development 123    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Latouche, S. (1992) ‘Standards of living’, in Sachs, W. (Ed.): The Development Dictionary:  
A Guide to Knowledge as Power, pp.250–263, London. 
Layard, R. (2005) Happiness: Lessons from a New Science, Penguin, London. 
Lazarus, J. (2008) ‘Participation in poverty reduction strategy papers: reviewing the past, assessing 
the present and predicting the future’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 6, pp.1205–21. 
Levinsohn, J. (2003) The World Bank’s Proverty Reduction Strategy Paper Approach: Good 
Marketing or Good Policy?, United Nations, New York. 
Manley, O. (1931) International Legislation: A Collection of the Texts of Multipartite International 
Instruments of General Interest, Beginning with the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC. 
Marx, K. (1993) Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Penguin, London. 
Matheson, J. (2011) Measuring National Well-Being: Measuring What Matters – National 
Statistician’s Reflections on the National Debate on Measuring National Well-Being, Office 
for National Statistics, London. 
McEwan, C. (2008) Postcolonialism and Development, Taylor and Francis, Hoboken, NJ. 
New Economics Foundation (2011) The Practical Politics of Well-Being, NEF, London. 
O’Donnell, G., Deaton, A., Duran, M. et al. (2014) Wellbeing and Policy, Legatum Institute, 
London. 
Oberdabernig, D.A. (2013) ‘Revisiting the effects of IMF programs on poverty and inequality’, 
World Development, Vol. 46, pp.113–142. 
Office for National Statistics (2013a) Personal Well-Being across the UK, 2012/13, ONS, London. 
Office for National Statistics (2013b) Personal Well-Being in the UK, 2012/13, ONS, London. 
Office for National Statistics (2014) Measuring National Well-Being: Life in the UK, 2014, HMSO, 
London. 
Office for National Statistics (2015) Personal Well-Being in the UK, 2014/15, HMSO, London. 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2007) Istanbul Declaration, OECD, 
Istanbul. 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2013a) OECD Guidelines on 
Measuring Subjective Well-Being, OECD, Paris. 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2013b) Measuring Well-Being and 
Progress, OECD, Paris. 
Pandolfelli, L.R., Shandra, J. and Tyagi, J. (2014) ‘The international monetary fund, structural 
adjustment, and women’s health: a cross-national analysis of maternal mortality in  
Sub-Saharan Africa’, The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 55, pp.119–142. 
Rizal, D. (2004) ‘The unknown refugee crisis: explusion of the ethnic Lhotsampa from Bhutan’, 
Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp.151–177. 
Rorty, R. (1980) ‘Pragmatism, relativism, and irrationalism’, Proceedings and Addresses of the 
American Philosophical Association, Vol. 53, No. 6, pp.719–738. 
Sayer, A. (1981) ‘Abstraction: a realist interpretation’, Radical Philosophy, Vol. 28, pp.6–15. 
Sayer, A. (1982) ‘Explanation in economic geography: abstraction versus generalization’, Progress 
in Human Geography, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp.68–88. 
Sayer, A. (2000) Realism and Social Science, Sage, London. 
Sen, A.K. (1989) ‘Development as capability expansion’, Journal of Development Planning,  
Vol. 19, No. 1, pp.41–58. 
Shandra, C.L., Shandra, J.M. and London, B. (2012) ‘The International Monetary Fund, structural 
adjustment, and infant mortality: a cross-national analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa’, Journal of 
Poverty, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp.194–219. 
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   124 M. Jenkins    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Stewart-Brown, S.L., Platt, S., Tennant, A. et al. (2011) ‘The Warwick-Edinburgh mental  
well-being scale: a valid and reliable tool for measuring mental well-being in diverse 
populations and projects’, Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, Vol. 65,  
No. Sup. 2, pp.A38–A39. 
Summerfield, G. and Aslanbeigui, N. (1998) ‘The impact of structural adjustment and economic 
reform on women’, in Stromquist, N.P. (Ed.): Women in the Third World: An Encylopedia of 
Contemporary Issues, pp.332–340, Garland Publishing, New York. 
United Nations General Assembly (2000) United Nations Millennium Declaration. Resolution 
Adopted by the General Assembly on 8 September 2000, UN General Assembly, New York. 
United Nations General Assembly (2012) The Future We Want. Resolution Adopted by the General 
Assembly on 27 July 2012, UN General Assembly, New York. 
UNHCR (2016) Nepal Factsheet [online] http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/ 
opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=50001f3c9&query=bhutan%20nepal (accessed 5 May 2016). 
Ura, K., Alkire, S., Zangmo, T. and Wangdi, K. (2012) An Extensive Analysis of GNH Index, 
Centre for Bhutan Studies, Thimphu, Bhutan. 
van de Walle, N. (2001) African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis 1979–1999, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Vetterlein, A. (2008) Lacking Ownership: the IMF and Its Engagement with Social Development as 
a Global Policy Norm, Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen. 
Weissman, S.R. (1990) ‘Structural adjustment in Africa: insights from the experiences of Ghana 
and Senegal’, World Development, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp.1621–1634. 
White, N. (2006) A Brief History of Happiness, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford. 
World Bank (1996) World Bank Participation Sourcebook, The World Bank, Washington, DC. 
World Health Organisation (2016) Age-Standardised Suicide Rater (per 100,000), dataset [online] 
http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.MHSUICIDEv (accessed 13 February 2016). 
